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This paper explores the relatinship between income distribution, prices,
production eﬃciency and aggregate output in a decentralized search economy.
We show that income distribution determines how competitive the market is,
and thereby aﬀects production eﬃciency and aggregate output. It is shown
that it is generally possible to engineer a judicious transfer of income from
high to low income individuals which simultaneously increases income equality,
competitiveness, and aggregate output.
Keywords: Search, Price Dispersion, Income Inequality.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
According to conventional wisdom, while income redistribution may be desirable on
grounds of fairness and social equity, the downside is that it reduces eﬃciency by
distorting incentives. Thus income equality and eﬃciency are often viewed as incom-
patible goals. In this paper we argue that, although this view may give the whole
picture in the idealized setting of perfectly competitive markets, it is at least incom-
plete in the more realistic world of imperfect information. In particular, we argue
that in the presence of informational imperfections, a transfer of income from the rich
to the poor may actually boost eﬃciency by making markets more competitive.
∗Avi Simhon, Department of agricultural economics and management, The Hebrew University,
P.O. Box 12, Rehovot, Israel. e-mail: asimhon@mscc.huji.ac.il
1Our approach is informed by the theoretically and empirically compelling recog-
nition, pioneered by Stigler (1961), that the need of imperfectly informed consumers
to invest in search and other costly information gathering activities plays an impor-
tant role in determining market structure, price formation and ￿rm pro￿tability.1 In
particular, theoretical considerations suggest that informational frictions endow ￿rms
with market power, the extent of which depends on consumers￿ incentive to search
for lower prices; The more motivated consumers are to search, the more pressure they
exert on ￿rms to lower prices, hence the more competitive the market is. Conversely,
the lower the consumers￿ propensity to search, the less competitive the market is.
The main insight of this paper is that changes in income distribution aﬀect market
structure by aﬀecting the incentives of market participants to acquire information.
Speci￿cally, a transfer of income from rich to poor consumers aﬀects the overall level of
consumer search activity in diverse ways. On the one hand, by increasing the income
of poorer individuals and enabling them to aﬀord higher prices, the transfer reduces
their incentive to search. This eﬀect reduces competitiveness in the market. On the
other hand, the transfer increases the incentive to search of wealthier individuals,
w h o s ei n c o m ei sr e d u c e db yt h et r a n s f e r . T h i sh a st h eo p p o s i t ee ﬀect of increasing
competitiveness. Hence, the eﬀects of income distribution on competitiveness may
generally be quite complex.
Nevertheless, we ￿nd that there generally exist income transfer schemes which
simultaneously increase both income equality and competitiveness. Moreover, the
transfer schemes which can achieve the twin goals of equality and competitiveness
have natural and desirable properties and we derive a very simple rule which the
policy maker can consult to determine whether a speci￿c transfer scheme is pro -
competitive.
1Stigler (1961) analyzed only the equilibrium behavior of consumers. Subsequent research - e.g.
Albrecht and Axel (1984), Burdett and Judd (1983), Butters (1977), Diamond (1987), Fershtman
and Fishman (1982), MacMinn (1980), Rob (1985), Reinganum (1979), Stahl (1989, 1996), Wilde
and Schwartz (1979) - focused on the sustainability of price dispersion as an equilibrium phenomenon
on both sides of the market. Studies which substantiate the empirical importance of consumer search
costs for price dispersion include Sorensen (2000), Baye and Morgan (2001), Brown and Goolsbee
(2002) and Lach (2002).
2We show that pro - competitive income transfers increases productivity and aggre-
gate output by motivating ￿rms to invest more eﬃciently. This is because the mar-
ket power enjoyed by ￿rms distorts their investment incentives and motivates them
to overinvest in production capacity. And the less competitive the market is, the
more severe the consequences of this distortion are. Therefore in our model, equality
- increasing, pro-competitive transfers simultaneously increase income equality and
output. The market - structure, information theoretic orientation of this approach to
understanding the relationship between income equality and eﬃciency distinguishes
it from more conventional analyses. While existing theories generally appeal to a
variety of macro and political economic factors to link equality and productivity (see
e.g. the survey of Benabou (1996)), here greater income equality, by nurturing a
more competitive market enviornment, can increase productivity by motivating more
eﬃcent investment.
2T h e M o d e l
Consider an economy with a continuum of households and ￿rms. The measure of
households is normalized to 1. Each household is endowed with L units of labor. L
is distributed heterogeneously between households according to the exogenous dis-
tribution function Λ(L) which is assumed to be continuously diﬀerentiable over its
entire support.2 Each household is both a worker and a consumer. It inelastically
supplies its labor endowment to a perfectly competitive labor market and purchases
consumption goods with the wages it earns. The total number of units of labor in
the economy is normalized to be 1.
There are two consumption goods. One good, termed the numeraire good, is con-
s u m e di ni n ￿nitely divisible units and is produced and sold in a Walrasian (perfectly
competitive) market. Consumers are perfectly informed about the price of this good.
The other good, termed the search good, is produced and sold by price setting ￿rms
2The interpretation is that each household is endowed with one unit of time, but the labor
productivity of this unit diﬀers across individuals.
3in a decentralized search market. In this market, consumers are imperfectly informed
about prices; They know the price distribution, but do not know which ￿rm charges
what price. To learn the price of any individual search good ￿rm, a consumer must
engage in costly search, as described in detail below. The price of the search good,
denoted p, is denominated in units of the numeraire good. We denote by F(p) the
cumulative distribution of the price of the search good. That is, F(p) is the propor-
tion of ￿rms whose price is less than or equal to p. The search good is produced in
indivisible units and a household demands at most one unit of it.
2.1 Consumers
To buy the search good, a consumer must engage in costly search. Each search reveals
t h ep r i c eo fo n er a n d o m l ys e l e c t e d￿rm and costs the consumer k>0 units of utility.3
Consumers may sequentially visit as many ￿r m sa st h e yw i s h .
All consumers have identical preferences. A consumer derives constant marginal
utility from the numeraire good. Its utility from the search good is s>0 for the
￿rst unit and zero from any additional unit. More speci￿cally, a consumer￿s utility
function is given as:
U(c1,c 2,n)=c1 + sc2 − hk (1)
where c1 is the (continuous) quantity consumed of the numeraire good, c2 ∈ {0,1} is
the number of units, zero or one, consumed of the search good, and h is the number
of search good ￿rms which the consumer visits before she buys. Thus hk is the loss
of utility from searching h times.
Each consumer faces the budget constraint c1+pc2 ≤ mi, where mi is his income,
denominated in units of the numeraire good, and p is the price paid for the search
good.
Consumers make the following interrelated decisions. First, given the distribution
3Formulating the cost of search in terms of utility ensures that the optimal search strategy is
stationary. If the cost of search were formulated in terms of goods, the consumers￿ reservation
price would not be stationary, since its wealth would decrease after each search. This would greatly
complicate the analysis.
4of prices for the search good, F(p), and its income, m, a consumer decides whether to
search (which involves a utility loss of k per search) or to forego consumption of the
search good and spend all its income on the numeraire good. If it decides to search
at least once, the consumer decides on a stopping rule that speci￿es which prices to
accept and which prices to reject. We refer to this two tiered decision process as a
consumer￿s decision rule.
It is well known (e.g., Weitzman, 1979) that under our assumptions the optimal
stopping rule - given that the consumer decides to search - is characterized by a
reservation price, with the property that the consumer keeps searching until it ￿nds
a price which is less than or equal to the reservation price. Upon ￿nding such a price,
it buys a unit and spends any remaining income on the numeraire good.
2.2 Production
Labor is the sole input used to produce each good. A ￿rm producing the numeraire
good can produce any quantity, using one unit of labor per unit of output. To
produce, a search good ￿rm must invest a ￿xed cost of v<1 units of labor. This
investment endows it with the capacity to produce any quantity at constant marginal
cost, which we normalize to zero. There is free entry into the search good industry.4.
The equilibrium measure of search good ￿rms is determined such that the pro￿to f
each ￿rm, net of the investment v,i sz e r o . 5
2.3 Income Distribution, Inequality and Transfers
Let ∆(m) be the distribution of income. Since the labor market is perfectly com-
petitive and the marginal product of labor in production of the numeraire good is 1,
the equilibrium wage (in terms of the numeraire good) per unit of labor is 1.6 Hence
4The assumption that v<1 ensures that a positive quantity of the numeraire good is produced
in equilibrium.
5Note that the number of ￿rms is in￿nite and yet each ￿rm employs a measure v of workers. To
see how this can be modeled explicitly see Burdett and Judd (1983).
6As noted in footnote 4, a positive quantity of the numeraire good is always produced in equi-
librium.
5∆(m)=Λ(L). We denote by m and m the lower and upper bound respectively of
the support of ∆(m) (i.e. the lowest and highest incomes in the economy) and by
δ(m) the density of ∆(m).
The goal of this paper is to establish the eﬀects of income distribution on market
competitiveness, eﬃciency and aggregate output. To focus on realistic redistribution
programs, we restrict attention to income transfers with the following desirable prop-
erties. The ￿rst of these is that the transfer be self-￿nancing. By this we mean that
the total income transferred, summed over all households, is zero (a zero sum trans-
fer). Second, policy considerations would typically require that poorer households
receive proportionally more (or contribute proportionally less) than richer house-
holds. Another realistic requirement is that the transfer be rank preserving. That
is, if household i￿s pre - transfer income was higher than that of household j,t h e n
household i continues to be wealthier after the transfer. We shall refer to an income
transfer with these properties as a ￿progressive transfer.￿ Formally:
De￿nition 1 Let the function t(m) be the post - transfer income of a household with









/∂m<0 (poorer households receive more or contribute less
than richer ones).
(iii) t0(m) > 0 (rank preservation).
Let ∆(m) and Φ(m) denote the pre and post - transfer income distributions,
respectively. Since by property (iii) t(m) is strictly increasing, Φ[t(m)] = ∆(m).
An important property of progressive transfers, proved in the proof of the following
lemma, is that Φ and ∆ cross exactly once. That is, there exists z, m <z<m such
that for m<z ,Φ(m) < ∆(m) and for m>z ,Φ(m) > ∆(m);s e e￿gure 1.T h es i n g l e
crossing property implies the following:
Lemma 1 A progressive transfer increases equality.
6Proof: We begin by proving the single crossing property. Properties (i)a n d( ii)
imply that t(m) >m . Suppose to the contrary that t(m)−m ≤ 0. Then by property
(ii) t(m)−m<0 for all m>m , implying that
R
[t(m)−m]d∆(m) < 0, contradicting
(i). Thus t(m) >m .
Since
R
[t(m)−m]d∆(m)=0and t(m) >m , there must be ￿ m satisfying t(￿ m) < ￿ m.
Since t(m) >m ,t (￿ m) < ￿ m and t is continuous, it follows from the Mean Value
Theorem that there is an interior income level, z, at which z = t(z). Then by property
(ii), t(m) >mfor all m<zand t(m) <mfor all m>z .That is, ∆ and Φ cross
exactly once, at z. Hence, and since Φ is increasing then for all m<z , Φ(m) <
Φ[t(m)] = ∆(m) and for m>z ,Φ(m) > ∆(m). This proves that Φ and ∆ cross
exactly once.
The single crossing property implies that Φ second order stochastically dominates
∆.A ss h o w nb yA t k i n s o n( 1970), this implies that Φ is ￿more equal￿ than ∆. Thus
a progressive transfer unambiguously increases income equality.
¥
3 Equilibrium
Denote the distribution of consumer reservation prices as G(x) and its density as g(x)
and let n denote the measure of search good ￿rms.
In equilibrium, given their income and the price distribution F(p), consumers
choose optimal decision rules. And given G(x), and F(p) each ￿rm chooses its price
to maximize its pro￿t. There are three markets: the market for each consumption
good and the labor market. Since the marginal cost of the search good is zero,
the total quantity of labor devoted to its production is the aggregate investment,
nν. All other labor is employed in the production of the numeraire good. Thus the
equilibrium quantity of the numeraire good, y, is y = 1 − nν. In equilibrium, all
markets clear. More formally,
7De￿nition 2 An equilibrium consists of a price distribution for the search good,
F(p), a distribution of consumer reservation prices, G(x), the quantity of the nu-
meraire good, y and the measure of operative search good ￿rms, n, such that:
(a) Given F and her income, m, a consumer￿s decision rule maximizes her ex-
pected utility.
(b) utility maximization by consumers reproduces G.
(c) Given consumers￿ decision rules, G and F, no ￿rm can increase its pro￿ts by
altering its price.
( d )A l lm a r k e t sc l e a r .
( e )E a c hs e a r c hg o o d￿rm earns zero pro￿ts.
4A n a l y s i s
The most a consumer is willing to pay for the search good is its marginal utility from
a unit, s. Also, no consumer can pay more than its income for a unit. Thus the most
ac o n s u m e rw i t ha ni n c o m eo fm w i l lp a yf o rt h es e a r c hg o o di smin{m,s}. Suppose
for a moment that the search good were sold by a monopoly. Then, since 1−∆(m)
is the measure of consumers with an income of at least m, the monopoly￿s revenue
from a price p ≤ s is p[1 − ∆(p)] and zero for a price p>s .Let pm denote the
monopoly price. We make the standard assumption (Bulow and Roberts, 1989) that
the monopoly￿s marginal revenue is strictly decreasing and equals the marginal cost




and m < e p<m where e p ≡ argmax{p[1 − ∆(p)]}.
Thus, pm = min{e p,s}.
Observe that a consumer who searches will optimally continue to search until it
￿nds a price not exceeding its reservation price (otherwise it would not be optimal
8to search even once). Thus, in any equilibrium, all consumers who search consume
a unit of the search good (and of course consumers who do not search consume only
the numeraire good).
As is typically the case in equilibrium search models, there exists a degenerate
￿Diamond￿ (Diamond, 1971) equilibrium for our model in which all ￿rms charge
the monopoly price pm and only consumers whose income is greater or equal to pm
consume the search good.7 However, there also exists a more plausible dispersed price
equilibrium in which diﬀerent ￿rms charge diﬀerent prices for the search good and
the average price is less than the monopoly price. We shall
restrict our attention to this equilibrium8. Accordingly, the term ￿equilibrium￿
will henceforth refer to the dispersed price equilibrium. We proceed to derive and
characterize this equilibrium.
Let A be the lowest price in the market and B>Athe highest price. Let ﬂ p
satisfy:
R ﬂ p
A F(x)dx = k. The following lemma states that ﬂ p is the reservation price of
all searching consumers whose income is above ﬂ p and that 9 the reservation prices of
searching consumers whose income is below ﬂ p is just their income.
Lemma 2 In a dispersed price equilibrium, the reservation price of a searching con-
sumer with income mi is min{mi, ﬂ p}.
Proof: By the reservation price property (e.g., Weitzman, 1979), ﬂ p is the reser-
vation price of a consumer whose income is at least ﬂ p. Since a consumer cannot pay
more than its income, its reservation price is min{mi, ﬂ p}.¥
7There are a few exceptions in which price dispersion is the unique equilibrium. Benabou (1992)
and Fishman (1992) show that price dispersion is the only equilibrium if prices are eroded by
in￿ation and it is costly for ￿rms to change prices. Albrect and Vroman (1998) show that the
Diamond equilibrium is eliminated in models with asymmetric information.
8The dispersed price equilibrium seems to be more plausible than the Diamond equilibrium
because it has the intuitive feature that the average price of the search good is lower, the lower the
cost of search and approaches the competitive price as the cost of search goes to zero. By contrast,
the Diamond equilibirum has the unintuitive feature that the price of the search good is independent
of the cost of search as long as the latter is positive.
9This property is due to the fact that the marginal utility from the numeraire good is constant and
therefore independent of income. If the marginal utility from the numeraire good were decreasing,
all consumers with diﬀerent incomes would have diﬀerent reservation prices. As we discuss in the
concluding section, this complication would not signi￿cantly change our main results.
9Models of equilibrium search typically assume that in equilibrium all consumers
buy the search good. However, in our general equilibrium framework this assumption
must be justi￿ed since consumers have the option of spending their entire income on
the numeraire good. We shall proceed assuming that in equilibrium all consumers do
indeed search and provide the parameter values which justify this assumption below.
Our working paper (Fishman and Simhon, 2003) analyzes the more complex case in
which not all consumers search and shows that our main ￿ndings continue to apply
in that case as well.
An immediate implication of Lemma 2, above, is that when all consumers search,
the reservation price distribution, G(x), is simply the income distribution function,
truncated at ﬂ p.
Corollary 1: If all consumers search, then:
G(x)=
‰
∆(x) if x<min{s, ﬂ p}
1 if x ≥ min{s, ﬂ p} .
The preceding result is used to construct the equilibrium price distribution in the
following lemma, whose proof is in the Appendix.
Lemma 3 Let [A,B] denote the support of F(p). If all consumers search, then
1. A = m, where m is the lowest income (the lower bound of the support of ∆).




In equilibrium, a ￿rm whose price is p sells only to consumers whose reservation
price is greater or equal to p. Hence, a ￿rm￿s market share is greater, the lower its
price. In equilibrium all ￿rms earn equal pro￿t. The equilibrium price distribution,
F(p), has the property that the trade-oﬀ between a ￿rm￿s market share (which de-
creases with its price) and its price per unit are so balanced that all prices generate
identical pro￿ts.
10The following assumption proves useful in economizing on tedious and repetitious
calculations.
Assumption 2:
(i)￿ p ≤ min{s, ﬂ p}




The assumption that ￿ p ≤ s means that the monopoly price is not constrained by
s. The assumption that ￿ p ≤ ﬂ p means that reservation price of the richest consumers
is greater than the monopoly price.
T h es e c o n dp a r to fA s s u m p t i o n2i ss h o w ni nt h ep r o o fo fL e m m a4t oe n s u r e
that in equilibrium all consumers search. Our working paper (Fishman and Simhon,
2003) provides a complete analysis of the cases when Assumption 2 does not hold
and shows that our main results apply qualitatively to those cases as well.
Lemma 4 There exists a unique dispersed price equilibrium in which all consumers
search.
Proof: The proof is in the Appendix
5 Inequality and output
We now have in place the infrastructure required to address the primary concern of
this paper: How do progressive transfers aﬀect competitiveness and aggregate output?
As is evident from Lemma 3, the equilibrium price distribution, F(p), is deter-
mined by the income distribution, ∆(m). Thus a change of the income distribution
leads to changes in the equilibrium price distribution and the revenues of the search
good industry. This is because in our search market setting, how aggressively ￿rms
compete and hence their pro￿ts depends on consumers￿ willingness to invest in costly
11search. Consumers￿ willingness to search in turn depends on the distribution of
income. In particular, a transfer of income from rich to poor individuals has two op-
posing eﬀects on consumers￿ overall search activity. Low income individuals, whose
income is increased by the transfer, have to search less to ￿nd a price they can af-
ford. This lowers their incentive to search. On the other hand the transfer increases
the motivation to search of wealthier individuals, whose income declines.10 Hence,
whether the eﬀect of income redistribution is to increase competition and lower in-
dustry revenues or to reduce competition and increase revenues depends on which of
those eﬀects is dominant.
Suppose the search good industry￿s revenues are decreased. Then, since each
search good ￿rm must invest ν and since the marginal cost is zero, the zero pro￿t
condition implies that the equilibrium number of ￿rms, n, must also decrease. Since
each consumer always consumes one unit of the search good, the equilibrium quantity
produced of the search good is independent of n. However, since each additional
search good ￿rm costs the economy an additional ν units of labor, the amount of labor
which is available to produce the numeraire good decreases with n. Thus, reducing
industry revenues increases output of the numeraire good without decreasing output
of the search good. Hence a progressive transfer which reduces industry revenues
simultaneously increases equality and aggregate output.
The following proposition is our main result. It states that there is a very simple
rule which determines whether a progressive transfer increases competitiveness (hence
increasing aggregate output) or decreases competitiveness (hence reducing aggregate
output).
Proposition A progressive transfer decreases the revenues of the search good sector
and increases output if z<Band increases revenues and decreases output if z>B .
10Under our assumption of constant marginal utility from the numeraire good, poorer individuals
search more only because it is harder for them to ￿nd an aﬀordable price. If marginal utility from
the numeraire good is decreasing, another reason for poorer individuals to search more is that they
obtain a higher marginal utility from the increased consumption of the numeraire good which is
enabled by paying a lower price for the search good.
12The immediate implication of the proposition is that the policy maker can al-
ways design a progressive transfer to simultaneously increases equality and aggregate
output by choosing z<B .
Before proving the proposition, we discuss the intuition for it. Recall that in
equilibrium all consumers whose income is less than B search until they ￿nd a price
which does not exceed their income while all consumers whose income is greater than
B accept any price. Suppose that z>Bso that the transfer reduces the income of
only the latter consumers. Rank preservation (property (iii) of De￿nition 1) implies
that those consumers￿ post transfer incomes are still greater than B and so would
continue to accept B if the price distribution were unchanged. Therefore, those
consumers propensity to search is unaﬀected by the transfer. On the other hand, the
transfer reduces the propensity to search of searching consumers, the bene￿ciaries of
t h et r a n s f e r ,w h o s ei n c o m ei sl e s st h a nz. Hence, a transfer with z>Breduces the
overall propensity to search, which reduces competition and increases industry pro￿t.
A n da sw ea r g u e da b o v e ,h i g h e rp r o ￿t leads to lower output.
By contrast, when z<Bhouseholds with income between z and B reduce their
reservation price and are induced to search more intensely than before the transfer.
This puts pressure on high priced ￿rms to reduce prices. This in turn exerts pressure
for price reductions in the entire industry, increasing competition, reducing industry
pro￿t, and increasing output.
We now sketch the proof of Proposition 1 and provide a detailed proof in the
Appendix. Consider a ￿rm which charges the highest price in the market, B. The
measure of consumers which accept this price is [1 − ∆(B)] and that ￿rm￿s share of
these customers is 1/n. Hence, its revenues is B[1−∆(B)]/n. And since in equilibrium
all ￿rms earn equal revenues (as marginal cost is zero, pro￿t equals revenues minus
entry costs) the revenues of the search good industry is B[1 − ∆(B)]. Similarly, the
post - transfer revenue of the search good sector is BΦ[1−Φ(BΦ)],w h e r eΦ(m) is the
post - transfer income distribution and BΦ is the value of B under Φ. The functions
m[1 − Φ(m)] and m[1 − ∆(m)] are drawn in ￿gure 2. As shown in the proof of
13Lemma 1, the former curve lies below the latter for m>z .As indicated by ￿gure 2a,
if z<B ,the aggregate revenue of the search good sector under Φ,B Φ[1−Φ(BΦ)],i s
smaller than the aggregate revenue under ∆,B[1−∆(B)]. Thus designing the transfer
with intersection point z below B ensures that ￿rms￿ revenues decline. By contrast,
choosing a transfer with intersection point z above B, as in ￿gure 2b, ensures that
￿rms￿ revenues increase.
6 Discussion of the Assumptions
We have developed a simple model of a search economy in which simple and realistic
income transfer schemes can simultaneously increase equality, eﬃciency and output
by making markets more competitive. We conclude by commenting on the robustness
of the model with respect to our main assumptions.
The ￿rst comment concerns our assumptions about consumer preferences. Our
analysis was simpli￿ed considerably by the assumption of constant marginal utility
from the numeraire good, as expressed by the utility function (1). This ensures that all
consumers with suﬃciently high incomes have the same reservation price (Corollary
1). However, our main results do not depend on this simplifying assumption. We have
also solved the model for the more general utility function of the type U(c1,c 2,n)=
u(c1)+sc2 − hk,w h e r eu() is a strictly concave function. Then, Corollary 1 no
longer obtains because all consumers with diﬀerent incomes have diﬀerent reservation
prices, which considerably complicates the analysis. Nevertheless, the basic message
of Proposition 1 continues to apply: a progressive transfer decreases industry revenue
and increases aggregate output if z is suﬃciently low, though not necessarily below
B.11 T h er e a s o n i n gi st h es a m ea sa b o v e ;t h et r a n s f e ri n c r e a s e sc o m p e t i t i v e n e s si f
some high income consumers which are hurt by the transfer are lead to search more
intensively.
Our second comment concerns the relationship between competitiveness and out-
11The precise technical condition and its proof are availabe from the authors upon request.
14put in our model. In our formulation, increased competitiveness resulting from greater
equality increases production eﬃciency and aggregate output by reducing wasteful in-
vestment in production capacity - wasteful because, under a constant returns to scale
technology (constant marginal cost), production eﬃciency requires the number of
operative ￿rms to be as small as possible. This is a convenient way to link competi-
tiveness with productivity in our model, but it is certainly not the only one. The usual
eﬃciency distortion associated with monopoly power - underproduction of the search
good - does not apply to our model in its present formulation because consumers
have unit demand. But it could be introduced by letting consumers have downward
sloping demand (as in Reinganum￿s (1979) search model). A second alternative, as in
Albrecht and Axell (1984) and Fershtman, Fishman and Simhon (2003), would arise
if potential producers of the search good are characterized by heterogenous marginal
production costs. In that case only ￿rms whose production cost is below the highest
equilibrium price would be operative. Under such a formulation, a decrease in ￿rms￿
market power and lower prices would enhance eﬃciency and increase aggregate out-
put by forcing the exit of the least eﬃcient ￿rms. Again, the result would be that
greater equality leads to more eﬃcient investment in search good production. Each
of these alternatives, and others, should generate qualitatively similar results to those
obtained here, but at considerably greater analytical expense.
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18P r o o fo fL e m m a3
1. We start by claiming that A ≥ m. Otherwise, a ￿rm charging A could raise its
price to A +m i n {m − A,k/2} without losing customers, thus increasing its pro￿ts.
Hence A ≥ m. If A>m , it could not be optimal for consumers whose income is less
than A to search. Thus, if all consumers search, A ≤ m. Hence A = m. This proves
part 1 of the Lemma.
2. First of all, since no consumer will pay more than s for the search good, B ≤ s.
Consumers with reservation price B and above buy at the ￿rst ￿rm that they en-
counter and therefore search exactly once. Therefore, the measure of these consumers
that arrive at every ￿rm is [1−G(B)]/n. Hence, the revenue of a ￿rm that charges B is
B[1−G(B)]/n. By the corollary, 1−G(x)=1−∆(x) for x<min{s, ﬂ p} and 1−G(x)=
0 for x>ﬂ p. Hence, that ￿rm￿s revenue is B[1 − ∆(B)]/n if B ≤ ﬂ p and zero if B>ﬂ p.
This proves that B ≤ min{s, ﬂ p}. If ￿ p ≡ ArgMaxx{x[1 − ∆(x)] ≤ min{s, ﬂ p}, the
pro￿t maximizing price for ￿rms whose price is B is ArgMaxx{x[1 − ∆(x)] .I f￿ p>
min{s, ﬂ p}, then, since by Assumption 1, x[1−∆(x)] is increasing for x<￿ p, the pro￿t
maximizing price for that ￿rm is min{s, ﬂ p}. Hence, B =m i n {s, ﬂ p, ￿ p} =m i n{ﬂ p,pm}.
3. The demand facing a ￿rm whose price is p is determined as follows. Consumers
reach the ￿rms in consecutive waves that follow each other instantaneously. In the
￿rst wave, each ￿rm is visited by 1/n consumers with reservation prices distributed
according to G. In this ￿rst wave, a proportion F(x) of the consumers with a reser-
vation price x ￿nd a price for which they buy, and the rest search again. Since the
second wave consists of those consumers who ￿rst sampled a ￿rm that charged more
than their reservation price, and since the initial density of these consumers is g(x),
it follows that in the second wave the per ￿rm density of consumers with reservation
price x is g(x)[1−F(x)]/n. In the third wave, this density is g(x)[1−F(x)]2/n, and
in the i + 1 wave it is g(x)[1 − F(x)]i/n.
Thus, given G and F, the pro￿to fas e a r c h￿rm that sets its price at p,d e n o t e d
π(p) is:12
















p g(x)dx =( 1 − G(p)) − (1 − G(B)), using the fact that the sum of













In equilibrium, all ￿rms earn zero pro￿ts. It can be easily veri￿ed that F(x)=
x2g(x)
B2g(B)
solves the equation π(p)=0 . Furthermore, by the corollary, g(x)=δ(x) for




P r o o fo fL e m m a4 :
Proof: All consumers get the same utility, s, by consuming the search good. On the
other hand, the expected search cost, hk, declines with income because the poorer the
consumer the more times she has to search, on average, to ￿nd a unit at an aﬀordable
price. Thus, all consumers search if and only if it is optimal for individuals with the
lowest income, m, to search. Those individuals search if and only if their expected
utility from search is at least as great as their expected utility from not searching
and consuming only the numeraire good. Their expected utility from not searching
is just m. By Lemma 3, A = m. Thus if the poorest consumers search, they buy only
at the lowest price, A, and consume only the search good. Hence, if h is the expected
number of searches required to ￿nd the price A, their expected utility from searching
is given by s−hk. By Lemma 3, F(m)=
m2δ(m)
B2δ(B) and therefore h = 1/F(m)=
B2δ(B)
m2δ(m).
Therefore, their expected utility from searching is greater or equal to their expected
utility from not searching if s −
B2δ(B)
m2δ(m)k ≥ m and since B ≤ e p the last inequality
holds if s ≥ m +
e p2δ(e p)
m2δ(m)k. Thus the preceding inequality implies that all consumers
search in equilibrium.




p g(x)[1 − F(x)]jdx/n is the sale to customers who previousely
encountered prices greater than their reservation price which they rejected.
20By Assumption 1, e p is unique, and by Assumption 2 and Lemma 3, B =￿ p. Hence
B is unique. By part 3 of Lemma 3 this implies that F(p) is unique and it follows
from Lemma 2 and Corollary 1 that G(p) is also unique. This proves existence and
uniqueness. ¥
Proof of the proposition:
We will prove the proposition by constructing such a transfer. Let t(m) be a
progressive transfer. For any variable x corresponding to ∆, let xΦ denote the value
of x under Φ. The proposition is proved using the following claims.
Claim 1: B is a continuous function of ∆.13
Proof : Since ∆ is continuous, it follows from Assumption 1 that ￿ p =a r gm a xm[1−
∆(m)] changes continuously with ∆. Since pm =m i n {s, ￿ p}and the minimum of con-
tinuous functions is continuous, the claim is proved.
Let t(m) have the property that z<B .By the preceding claim, and for a suﬃ-
ciently small transfer, i.e. t(m) − m suﬃciently small, z<Bimplies z<B Φ.T h e n
since B =￿ p =a r gm a xm[1 − ∆(m)],
B [1 − ∆(B)] ≥ BΦ [1 − ∆(BΦ)] (2)
and by Lemma 1,f o ra l lm>z ,Φ(m) > ∆(m) and the fact that z<B Φ
BΦ[1 − ∆(BΦ)] >B Φ[1 − Φ(BΦ)]. (3)
Hence, it follows from (2) and (3) that
B [1 − ∆(B)] >B Φ[1 − Φ(BΦ)]. (4)













Thus, zero pro￿ts imply π(B)=B[1 − ∆(B)]/n − v =0and it follows that
vn = B[1 − ∆(B)] (5)
vnΦ = BΦ[1 − Φ(BΦ)].
13Using, for example, the maximum absolute value distance measure.
21It follows from (4) and (5) that vnΦ <v n ∆. Since y = 1 − νn and yΦ = 1 − νnΦ,
it follows that yΦ >y ∆. Since by Lemma 1 Φ is more equal than ∆, this completes
the proof of the proposition for z<B . The proof for z>Bis the same, and that
completes the proof of the proposition. ¥
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